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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

G2-PC

19 July 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

ATTENTION: Mr. Montague

SUBJECT: Status and Timing of Current U. S. Programs for
National Security

REFERENCE: Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "United
States Objectives and Programs for National Security,"
dated July 12, 1951

1. In recent months the Department of the Army's Intelligence and related activities program has been greatly intensified and improved by the following:

a. A marked increase in personnel was authorized (approximately 40 officers) for military attache offices in peripheral areas. Additionally, six new stations were reopened.

b. Personnel increases have been authorized for the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and related activities. Training facilities have expanded and are in the process of accelerating specialist training.

c. Relative to security:

(1) The Department of the Army security program has been streamlined and stepped-up.

(2) National Censorship program has been brought to a state of readiness for war or emergency.

(3) A Tripartite Security Survey has been made to insure adequate security for U. S. information made available to the U. K. and France.

d. A considerable increase in Communications Intelligence (COMINT) support has been furnished overseas theaters, particularly FICOM. Support of AFSA has also been materially increased.

e. The activities of the Watch Committee have been expanded in scope and effectiveness in analyzing indications of hostile intent by possible enemy nations. This activity now embraces the efforts of all IAC agencies.

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Army review(s) completed.

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3. The intensification program has been hampered by:
 - a. The unavailability of qualified personnel and the necessity for intensifying the training of intelligence personnel.
 - b. The extremely limited access to Iron Curtain countries.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:



O. B. SYKES
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Planning and
Coordinating Office

25X1 Receipt signed by Mr. , 19 Jul 51, at G-2.

25X1 Mr. - is in Mr. Reber's office

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AN APPRAISAL OF THE US FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

1. The National Security Act of 1947 gave CIA 3 major types of functions to be performed "for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities" of the Government.

a. To advise the NSC in matters concerning intelligence activities relating to national security and to make recommendations for their coordination.

b. To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security.

c. To perform services of common concern and such other functions as the NSC may direct.

Common Services

2. CIA has been told by the NSC to perform services of common concern in the following fields: (a) monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts, (NSC⁶ ID); (b) espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad; (NSC⁵ ID); (c) domestic exploitation of defectors outside the US (NSC⁷ ID-13); (d) scientific and technical biographical data, (NSC⁸ ID); (e) certain economic data and analysis of the Soviet Orbit economy, (NSC¹⁵ ID-15).

3. In the NSC-10 Series CIA was directed to perform certain special functions through the Office of Policy Coordination. These operations are becoming a much larger and more important instrument of US foreign policy in the semi-open struggle with Communism. In addition to this responsibility the President has recently named the DCM to membership on the Psychological Strategy Board to assist in formulating, approving, carrying out and revising

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SECRET

SECRET

national psychological strategy for the cold or hot war with the USSR.

National Intelligence

4. National intelligence has been defined in NSCID-3 as "integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern in more than one Department or Agency and transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency of the Military Establishment." Two types of national intelligence have so far been identified. The program for the production of basic intelligence was outlined in NSCID-3 in January 1948. Work is continuing on this inclusive program and the production rate is as high as personnel limitations and conflicting demands permit. In the second category, coordinated national intelligence estimates are now being produced by the IAC agencies under the leadership of CIA's new National Estimates Board. All interested intelligence units are consulted so that these estimates contain the most authoritative intelligence opinion available in the Federal Government.

Coordination

5. With respect to the NSC, CIA's functions are all assigned "for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities..." and the Agency is specifically directed, in addition to advising in intelligence matters, "to make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of such intelligence activities ... as relate to the national security." This wording together with other parts of the statute makes it clear that CIA was neither intended to be merely a 5th intelligence agency nor yet was it given the authority to direct the activities of the existing units. It was the intention of Congress to give CIA the more difficult task of leading and stimulating the

SECRET

SECRET

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intelligence community and referring to the NSC matters which required an imprint of authority. Practical politics as well as the principles of good staff work make it necessary for CIA to achieve coordination among the agencies by persuasion in such a way as not to require the attention of the NSC on trivial matters. Furthermore, CIA's function of "coordination by persuasion" does not necessarily require it to assume a strong active role after the initial arrangements have been established. CIA's responsibility is to see that coordination is accomplished in a given field, not necessarily to accomplish it personally, if for instance G-2 or State were more directly concerned in the matter.

6. CIA's statutory position and responsibility make coordination an essential element of all other activities of the Agency. The keystone and focal point of this coordination is the Intelligence Advisory Committee. In this group the heads of the intelligence agencies consult, transact common business, and by their attitudes and persuasiveness set the stage for all the relations of their subordinates. This relationship is based on the concepts that each agency is primarily responsible and presumptively capable in its own field of dominant interest and that a coordinated prebust is desirable wherever responsibilities overlap. The conduct of necessary coordination is a part of the job of each Agency and within CIA, of each Assistant Director. Because of the nature of the coordination job the Office of Intelligence Coordination has been established as a focal point and as necessary to assist and advise the responsible officers to set up and carry out this coordination.

Progress

7. The following are the chief areas of accomplishment in the US foreign intelligence system in the past year. None of the items listed is

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SECRET

SECRET

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considered completely satisfactory but each constitutes a significant advance on which to base further improvement:

- a. The Intelligence Advisory Committee has been developed into an invaluable forum for consultation between the responsible intelligence heads.
- b. Beginning in the IAC and working down to other levels, attitudes of cooperation and mutual respect are being developed.
- c. Coordinated national intelligence estimates of high quality are being produced on selected major subjects of concern to the Government's policy officials.
- d. An increased emphasis is being placed on the production of current intelligence of an all-source, all-subject nature.
- e. A coordinated if still imperfect machinery has been established for interagency evaluation of indications of hostile intentions.
- f. Arrangements have been made for the systematic analysis of the Soviet Orbit economy and for the coordination of economic intelligence.
- g. The working relations between CIA personnel and military authorities in US theaters of occupation have been improved and clarified.

Outstanding Problems

8. The following are the major areas in which further work must be done in order to create a strong, effective and reliable intelligence system:

SECRET

SECRET

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- a. There is still not a full exchange of finished intelligence between CIA, State and the military agencies.
- b. Further efforts are required to gain acceptance of a procedure for obtaining joint estimates that take into account all plans, operations and capabilities.
- c. The relationship of Intelligence to policy planning and specific policy decisions needs examination so that Intelligence will provide at the proper time the maximum help of which it is capable.
- d. Coordination and production in the field of scientific intelligence has not yet been placed on a sound footing.
- e. In the field of current intelligence O/CI's relationship with other agencies must be clarified.
- f. The contribution of State's "R" area is greatly hindered by the requirement that its papers must be cleared with the political bureaus before distribution outside the Department.
- g. Further consideration seems to be indicated of the arrangements for control of special intelligence facilities in wartime.
- h. The possibility should be explored of increasing the desirability for military officers of a career specialization in intelligence and foreign affairs.
- i. The problem of requirements and priorities for collection needs continued concentrated effort.
- j. It may be possible and desirable for the DCI to develop a role with respect to budget and personnel ceilings of the other IAC agencies -- at least as they affect National Intelligence.

h. Deletions

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